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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Extortion—Federal Criminal Liability for Strike Vio-
lence under the Hobbs Act'— United States v. Enmons.2—Appellees,
members and officials of Local 2286 of the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, were indicted under the Hobbs Act for an
alleged conspiracy to obstruct commerce in the course of a strike
against their employer, the Gulf States Utilities Company. The indict-
ment charged that the appellees conspired to use and did use violence
to obtain higher wages and other benefits from the Company for its
employees. Appellees were charged with five specific acts of violence
aimed at destroying the Company's transformers. The Government
maintained that this action was within the Act's prohibition of "extor-
tion" which is defined as "the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear. . . ." 3 The Government thus claimed that the
wages sought were "property" of the employer and that strike vio-
lence to obtain such "property" is a violation of the Act.
The trial court granted appellees' motion to dismiss the indictment
for failure to state an offense under the Hobbs Act. 4 The district court
ruled that the use of force to obtain legitimate union objectives during
a lawful strike is not a violation of the Hobbs Act. In the court's view,
the Hobbs Act would apply in this kind of situation only if the strikers
were using violence to obtain "wages to be paid for unneeded or un-
wanted services, or for no services at all."'
The Supreme Court reviewed the case on direct appeal° and, in
affirming the district court's dismissal, HELD: violence committed
during a lawful strike for the purpose of inducing an employer's
agreement to legitimate collective bargaining demands concerning
compensation for services desired by or valuable to the employer does
not constitute "extortion" under the Hobbs Act. The Court reached
this decision through its interpretation of "extortion" in the Hobbs
Act. In the Court's view, there can be extortion only where there is
"a wrongful obtaining of property." This is true because the word
"wrongful" in the statute, to have any meaning, must be construed
to modify "obtaining of property." Under this analysis, union activity
which is aimed at obtaining legitimate union goals, such as wages for
1 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
2 - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 1007 (1973).
8 18 U.S.C. § 1931(b)(2) (1970).
4 333 F. Supp. 641, 79 L.R.R.M. 2074 (E.D. La. 1971).
8 Id. at 645, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2076.
0 The Supreme Court allowed the appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act, ch. 2564,
34 Stat. 1246 (1907), which provided for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of certain
dismissals of indictments. The present statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970), provides for
appeal to a circuit court of appeals, but this action was instituted before the new
provision took effect.
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genuine services desired by the employer, cannot be extortion. In such
a case, there is no "wrongful obtaining of property" because the work-
ers have a legitimate claim to the wages.?
The Court's decision definitively places strike violence practiced
for the usual objectives of strikes outside the reach of the federal crim-
inal law with its severe felony penalties and thereby leaves control of
such violence to the states. The precise degree to which federal law
which prohibits violence interfering with interstate commerce applies
to union activities has been unclear since the passage of the Anti-
racketeering Act of 1934,8
 the predecessor of the Hobbs Act. When
the Antiracketeering Act was given a restrictive interpretation in a
labor context by the Supreme Court,° Congress responded with the
Hobbs Act which expanded the Antiracketeering Act's coverage of
labor activities. The present case establishes a limit to that expanded
coverage. This note will examine the history of federal treatment of
labor violence which affects interstate commerce and analyze the pres-
ent Supreme Court decision and its implications in light of that history.
More specifically, the legislative background of the Hobbs Act will be
discussed, especially with reference to the Antiracketeering Act of
1934, the Supreme Court's decision interpreting that Act in Teamsters
Local 80710
 and Congressional reaction to that case. The note will
then review the only prior Supreme Court case interpreting the Hobbs
Act in a labor context, United States v. Green." A discussion of the
Enmons opinion will follow. Finally, the state of federal law prohibit-
ing strike violence will be discussed in light of Enmons.
The Supreme Court's decision in Enmons relied to a great extent
on the legislative, history of the Hobbs Act. That legislative history
begins with the Antiracketeering Act of 1934. Basically, the Anti-
racketeering Act prohibited the use of, attempts to use or threats' to
use force, violence or coercion to obtain money or other valuable con-
sideration when such action affected interstate commerce.12 According
7 93 S. Ct. at 1010.
8
 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979-80.
9 United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942). See text at note 16
infra.
10 Id.
11 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
12 Section 2 of the Antiracketeering Act provides that:
Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way
or in any degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity
moving or about to move in trade or commerce—
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat
to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable
considerations, or the purchase or rental of property or protective services, not
including, however, the payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona
fide employee; or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful
use of force or fear, or under color of official right; or
(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical
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to the chairman of the House committee which reported on the bill,
it was one of a number of bills aimed at the activities of gangsters
of the Kelly and Dillinger types."' The Act contained three provi-
sions which placed severe restrictions on its possible application to
labor situations. Sections 2(a) and 3 (b) of the Act" exempted pay-
ment of "wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee"
from the definition of property whose acquisition by use of force would
violate the Act, while section 6 15
 provided that no court could construe
the Act as limiting the rights of a bona fide labor organization in
carrying out its legitimate objectives. The Antiracketeering Act thus
did not cover violence in the ordinary strike where employees were
seeking wages and benefits from their employer. The uncertainty arose
in the Act's application to other cases of labor violence such as violent
action forcing an employer to hire union employees.
The Supreme Court was faced with an application of the Anti-
racketeering Act in a labor context in United States v. Teamsters
Local 807." The defendants in this criminal proceeding were the local,
two officials, and twenty-six individual members of the local. Up to
the time of the events for which the defendants were indicted, drivers
of out of state trucks had delivered their cargoes in New York City
and picked up other cargoes to return to other states. The evidence
established that the defendants conspired to use violence and did use
violence and threats of violence to obtain from the owners of the
trucks the regular union rate for a day's work of driving and unload-
ing. When the forced compensation, was paid, the union members
sometimes performed the services and sometimes did not—either be-
cause the owners or drivers turned them down or because the teamsters
refused to perform the services. Eventually, many of the owners signed
contracts with the union agreeing that members of the local would do
all of the driving, loading and unloading within the city at the regular
union rates."
The defendants were convicted in federal district court under vary-
ing counts of the indictment.' The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the conviction on the ground that the trial court's
charge to the jury did not make it clear that the labor exceptions to
the Antiracketeering Act's' take such activities out of the reach of the
injury to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate
subsections (a) or (b); or
(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other person or persons to
commit any of the foregoing acts, shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a
felony .
Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, § 2, 48 Stat. 979-80.
18
 S. Rep. No. 1440, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (3942).
14
 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, §§ 2(a), 3(b), 48 Stat. 980.
15 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 	 5, 48 Stat. 980.
10 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
17 Id. at 525-26.
18 118 F.2d 684, 685, 8 L.R.R.M. 468 (2d Cir. 1941).
19
 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 1$ 2(a), 3(b), 5, 48 Stat. 980.
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Act when the defendants actually intend to perform the work for which
the payment is sought." The court ruled that this kind of action by
employees or prospective employees would violate the Act only if they
intended to receive payment without rendering any services. 21 In af-
firming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that there is no
violation of the Antiracketeering Act when the defendants' purpose in
seeking payments is actually to perform services in return for the pay-
ments—even if the employer refuses to accept the services. The Court
reached this position by deciding that the section 2 (a) exemption for
the payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee 22
removed this kind of situation from the coverage of the Act. The Court
interpreted the wage exception in this way for two reasons. First, it
found that exclusion of those seeking employment from the exemp-
tion would be inconsistent with legislative intent because it would
exclude too broad a class of labor disputes from the coverage of the
labor exemption." In addition, the Court interpreted the term "any
person" at the beginning of section 2 as modifying the entire section
so that the exemption removes "any person who ... obtains or attempts
to obtain . . . the payment of wages from a bona fide employer to a
bona fide employee," from the coverage of the Act.24 Under this view,
the exemptions covered persons who are seeking bona fide employment
as well as those who are already employees.' The Court's decision in
Local 807 thus left the Antiracketeering Act's application to labor
disputes very limited. As long as those demanding payment had an
intention of performing services, they were protected from federal
prosecution even if the services were unwanted or superfluous. The
only activity in a union situation which survived Local 807 as a clear
violation of the Act was violence in connection with demands for com-
pensation for no services or for services which the actors had no in-
tention of rendering.28
Adverse congressional reaction swiftly followed the Supreme
Court's decision in Local 807. It was referred to as an "amazing deci-
sion"' and one Congressman claimed that it "legitimatized highway
robbery when committed by a labor goon!" 2B Several bills were intro-
duced to overrule the Supreme Court's decision through legislation,
and they met with varying degrees of success." The Hobbs Act finally
29 118 F.2d 684, 8 L.R.R.M. 468 (2d Cir. 1941).
21 Id. at 686, 8 L.R.R.M. at 468.
22 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, § 5, 48 Stat. 980.
28
 315 U.S. at 531.
24 Id. For the text of section 2, see note 12 supra.
28 Id.
20 Id. at 534.
27 91 Cong. Rec. 11,900 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Hancock).
28 91 Cong. Rec. 11,841 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Cox).
20 S. 2347, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. 6872, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942);
H.R. 7067, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. 653, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H.R. 32,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
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emerged as the product of these congressional efforts to strengthen fed-
eral criminal sanctions for labor violence interfering with commerce.
The Hobbs Act defined the prohibited interference in terms of
robbery and extortion instead of proscribing interference in general
terms, and it also provided for punishment of a conspiracy or attempt
to violate its provisions." The extortion prohibition is the provision
of the Act which could apply to labor situations. The Act defines ex-
tortion as the obtaining of another's property with his consent induced
by wrongful force, violence or fear.8' In drafting the new Act, Congress
attempted to reconcile two somewhat competing aims. On the one hand,
it wanted to put more teeth into the statute in order to cover situations
where labor overstepped its bounds. On the other hand, Congress
wanted to accomplish this aim without interfering with the legitimate
activities of organized labor. In order to prevent a recurrence of the
Supreme Court's treatment of the Antiracketeering Act, the labor
exemptions" were left out of the new Act." In their place, a provisions'
was inserted" declaring that the act was "not to be construed to repeal,
modify or affect" the Norris-LaGuardia Act," the Clayton Act,"
the Railway Labor Act," or the National Labor Relations Act." Unions
would thus continue to have the protection of the major federal stat-
utes defining their rights.
At this point, it was clear that violence or threats of violence to
obtain payments for no work at all or for work which the actor bad
no intention of performing remained a violation of federal criminal
law. The Supreme Court had decided that such action violated the
Antiracketeering Act," the leniency of which the Hobbs Act was in-
tended to correct. If the Hobbs Act was successful in achieving its
objective of changing the result of Local 807, there would be a viola-
tion of its provisions where violence or the threat thereof was used
to obtain wages for services for which the employer had no desire or
need. Although the statute appeared to achieve this result on its face,
the question remained whether the courts would frustrate this purpose
ao Title
 I of the Hobbs Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. 4 1951(a) (1970), provides that:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property In furtherance of a plan or purpose
to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000
or be imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
81 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1970).
32 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, I§ 2(a), 3(b), 5, 48 Stat. 980.
83 91 Cong. Rec. 11,912 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Hobbs).
84 18	 § 1951(c) ( 1970).
35 H.R. Rep. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1945).
so 29 U.S.C. § I0I-15 (1970).
87 15 U.S.C. § 12-27, 44 (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
se 45 U.S.C. U 151-63, 181-88 (1970).
89 29 U.S.C. 44 151-66 ( 1970)•
40 United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
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through a restrictive interpretation.41
 A second question presented by
the Hobbs Act was whether or not its provisions would apply when the
violence or force was used to induce an employei to give compensation
for services which he needed and wanted. 42
 The Supreme Court an-
swered the first of these questions in its 1956 decision of United States
v. Green," and the second, at least in part, in Enmons. In Green, the
only Supreme Court decision prior to Enmons dealing with the Hobbs
Act in a labor context, the Court held that a union and a union official
were properly indicted under the Hobbs Act for using threats of vio-
lence to obtain wages for unwanted and unneeded work. The Court
thereby decided that the Hobbs Act had accomplished its purpose of
changing the result in Local 807. The union local and official in Green •
were charged with using threats of force to persuade a contractor to
hire union laborers to scout ahead of each of his bulldozers to warn
of approaching pitfalls. The employer did not want the laborers and
saw no need for them„ He had always done such work in the past with-
out laborers. Union members resorted to threatened violence to change
the employer's mind."
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of a motion
in arrest of judgment and held that force, violence or threats used to
obtain compensation for "imposed, unwanted, superfluous and ficti-
tious services" is a violation of the Hobbs Act." The Court reached
this decision in spite of its then recent rulings" that union efforts to
secure "make work" for their members were not unfair labor practices
under the Taft-Hartley Act's prohibition against forcing an employer
to accept "featherbedding."'" In the Taft-Hartley cases, the Court had
41
 Some observers believed that the Hobbs Act did not accomplish its purpose
of changing the result in Local 807. Note, Labor Law—A New Federal Antiracketeering
Law, 35 Geo. L.J. 362, 366 (1947); Note, Labor Faces the Amended Anti-Racketeering
Act, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1030, 1042 (1953).
42
 For an analysis of the ambiguity that remained after the enactment of the
Hobbs Act, see Note, The Hobbs Act—An Amendment to the Federal Anti-Racketeering
Act, 25 N.C.L. Rev. 58 (1946).
43
 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
44
 The facts referred to here are contained in the Seventh Circuit's decision review-
ing the district court opinion after remand from the Supreme Court. United States v.
Green, 246 F.2d 155, 158, 40 L.R.R.M. 2343 (7th Cir. 1957).
46 350 U.S. at 417. The Supreme Court did not find that the particular work for
which compensation was sought in Green was in fact "imposed, unwanted, superfluous
and fictitious." The Court held only that an allegation that compensation was wrongfully
sought for work in that category states an offense under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 421.
The union could have argued that the compensation was for work necessary as a safety
precaution and that the dispute was therefore over a legitimate condition of employment.
46
 American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); NLRB v.
Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117 (1953).
47 Section 8(b)(6) provides that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— .. .
(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to
pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction,
for services which are not performed or not to be performed . . .
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6) (1970).
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held that union activity aimed at forcing an employer to hire stand-by
help did not violate the Taft-Hartley Act unless the employees did not
intend to perform even that work. In Green, the Court upheld a Hobbs
Act indictment which did not contain any allegation that the workers
did not intend to perform the work. The Court pointed out that the
district court had improperly relied on the Supreme Court's decisions
in the Taft-Hartley cases as a basis for a decision that there was no
violation of the Hobbs Act. 48 The Court apparently recognized that
the Taft-Hartley Act and the Hobbs Act were addressed to different
types of work: the Taft-Hartley Act prohibits seeking compensation
for work which the union has no intention of performing; the Hobbs
Act is concerned with unnecessary or unwanted work even though the
union or members intend to perform this work. The Court thus found
a violation of the Hobbs Act through a classification, independent of
the other federal labor acts, of the categories of work for which com-
pensation is sought. The Court's decision in Green, then, established
the fact that the Hobbs Act was successful in its purpose of extending
coverage to the area of violence to obtain payment for unneeded or
unwanted work. The remaining question was how far the courts would
apply the Hobbs Act beyond merely changing the result in Local 807.
In United States v. Enmons, the Supreme Court addressed itself
to further delineation of the Hobbs Act. In this case, the Court placed
an important limitation on the Act in its application to labor cases by
putting "legitimate union objectives" sought in a "lawful strike" out-
side the scope of the "wrongful obtaining of property" necessary for
a violation of the Act. The Court ruled that if employees or prospective
employees use force, violence or threats during a lawful strike to ob-
tain compensation for actual work needed by the employer, their action
is beyond the reach of the Hobbs Act. Obtaining compensation for
such work is not "wrongful" because the workers have a legitimate
claim to the wages. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned
that: "In that type of case, there has been no 'wrongful' taking of the
employer's property; he has paid for the services he bargained for, and
the workers receive the wages to which they are entitled in compensa-
tion for their services.'
The Government took the position in Enmons that the appellees'
action of destroying transformers to induce the employer's agreement
to collective bargaining demands is clearly prohibited by the statute
on its face. The statute defines "extortion" as "the obtaining of prop-
erty from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual
or threatened force, violence, or fear . 2' 88 It was the Government's
contention that appellees' conduct fell within the literal prohibition of
this section. The workers conspired to obtain the employer's property,
in this case wages, with his consent induced by wrongful use of vio-
48
 350 U.S. at 418.
48 93 S. Ct. at 1010.
50
 18 U.S.C. I 1951(10(2) (1970).
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lence." The Court declined to accept the Government's contention and
stated that the language of the statute and its legislative history re-
quired it to reach the opposite result. In addition, the Court found
that the Government's view of the statute would lead to undesirable
difficulties in its application.
The Court did not find the language of the statute to be as unam-
biguous as the Government maintained it was. In the Court's view, the
term "wrongful" would be superfluous if it modified only the enumer-
ated means of obtaining property." "Wrongful" must be interpreted
as limiting the coverage of the statute to cases where obtaining the
property is wrongful. In the Court's view, there is no violation of the
statute where the actor has a lawful claim to the property in the way
that workers have to wages for genuine services." Such a taking of
property—i.e., wages—could not be "wrongful." The Court's analysis
in this area is very persuasive, especially in light of Congressman
Hobbs' remark in the House debates that "wrongful" was to modify
the entire section of the statute." The language of the statute, espe-
cially in light of this clarification from its sponsor, is sufficient to
support the Court's decision in the case.
The Court also found support for its view in the legislative history
of the Act. It pointed to many instances throughout the debates where
congressmen made statements which support the Court's limited read-
ing of the statute." It is clear from the overall legislative history that
the main concern of those involved in the Act's preparation and passage
was the type of union activity involved in Local 807." The committee
hearings are filled with testimony of victims who had suffered the same
injustice as the truck owners in Local 807." The committee report on
the Hobbs Act simply quoted the full opinion of the Supreme Court
in Local 807 and went on to state that the bill was designed to "prevent
interference with insterstate commerce, by robbery or extortion, as
defined in the bill . . . . "58 The Court's reference to the statement by
Congressman Hobbs statement which expressly supports the Court's
interpretation gives added credence to the result reached by the ma-
jority. Congressman Hobbs specifically stated that the Act would not
apply to picket line violence during a lawful strike." This statement
51 93 S. Ct. at 1009. The dissent, consisting of Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Douglas, Powell and Rehnquist, substantially accepted the Government's interpretation of
the statute. In addition, the dissent contended that the legislative history supports this
interpretation. Id. at 1016-19.
52 Id. at 1009-10.
58
 Id. at 1010.
54 Id
. at 1009 n.2.
65 91 Cong. Rec. 11,839-48, 11,899-922 (1945).
58 Id.
57 Hearings on Injunctions Against Illegitimate Labor Practices and Outlawing
Racketeering Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942).
58 H.R. Rep. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
58 89 Cong. Rec. 3213 (1943) (remarks of Congressman Hobbs).
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supports the Court's interpretation in spite of the fact that it was made
two years before the Act was passed and was made in reference to an
earlier version of the bill. The version that ultimately became the
Hobbs Act is substantially the same as the earlier version." There
are some statements in the congressional debates which are consistent
with the Government's interpretation of the Act," but there is a notice-
able absence of a clear statement which actually supports that inter-
pretation.
If the Government's view were to be accepted, the Court pointed
out, there would be difficulty in restricting the Act's application. The
"worker who threw a punch on a picket line" or "the striker who de-
flated the tires on his employer's truck" would be subject to harsh
felony penalties." Although it would be possible to carve out a judi-
cially-created exception to the statute to preclude its application in
situations involving only minor violence, such an exception would re-
quire a departure from the language of the statute. The point that
Congress would not desire such a harsh result as felony penalties for
minor violence, yet did not include an exception for minor incidents,
supports the Court's interpretation of the statute.
The majority's interpretation of the Hobbs Act in this case ap-
pears to be the proper one in light of the Act's language and legislative
history. Any expansion• of the Act's coverage should be made legisla-
tively and not judicially.
The Supreme Court's decision in Enmons brings more clarity to
the area of federal policing of strike violence, but a significant degree
of uncertainty remains. It is still clear that, as Green held, force or
threats of force to obtain compensation for unwanted or unneeded
services, or for no services at all, violates the Hobbs Act." The un-
certainty that remains is in cases where the payment is sought for
services desired by or valuable to the employer. Within this area,
it is clear that violence or threats of violence during a lawful strike
to obtain legitimate collective bargaining demands concerning services
desired by or valuable to the employer does not violate the Hobbs
Act. The remaining question is where the line will be drawn within
the area of cases involving services desired by or valuable to the
employer.
Throughout its opinion in Enmons, the Supreme Court continually
makes reference to such terms as "lawful strike" and "legitimate col-
lective bargaining objectives."" In addition, the Court approvingly
refers to such language used by the district court as "the strike and
00 93 S. Ct. at 1012 n.14.
61 91 Cong. Rec. 11,843 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Michener); 91 Cong.
Rec. 11,918 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Baldwin); 91 Cong. Rec. 11,914 (1945)
(remarks of Congressman Mercantonio); 91 Cong. Rec. 11,916 (1945) (remarks of
Congressman Blemiller).
02 93 S. Ct. at 1015.
08 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
64 93 B. Ct. at 1009, 1012, 1014, 1015.
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its objectives of higher wages were legal" and the defendants were
"lawfully striking.' " It is submitted that the significance and the
scope given to such terms will provide the answer to the question
of where the courts will draw the line between lawful and unlawful
conduct under the Hobbs Act. There are basically two interpretations
that these terms can be given in future applications of the Hobbs Act.
First, they can be viewed as establishing separate standards in addition
to the standard of examining the types of work for which compensa-
tion is sought." Under this view, violence or threats of violence to
obtain payment for genuine services would violate the Hobbs Act where
the strike is "unlawful" or the collective bargaining demands are "il-
legitimate." The other interpretation is that these terms merely provide
a standard which is synonymous with the standard of examining the
work for which payment is sought. Under this latter interpretation,' an
"unlawful strike" would be, for purposes of the Hobbs Act, a strike
directed toward the obtaining of compensation for unwanted or un-
needed work; likewise, an illegitimate collective bargaining objective
would be synonymous with compensation for unwanted or unneeded
work. This view would preclude finding a violation of the Hobbs Act
in any case in which the objective of the labor activity is compensa-
tion for work desired by and useful to the employer.
If the terms "lawful strike" and "legitimate collective bargaining
objective" are treated as independent standards, it will be necessary
to determine exactly what an "unlawful strike" is and what constitutes
"illegitimate collective bargaining objectives." These terms would pre-
sumably be defined through an analysis of national labor policy. The
major federal labor statutes and their interpretations can be viewed
as together establishing a national labor policy.7 The most logical
way of defining an unlawful strike or an illegitimate collective bargain-
ing goal is in light of this national policy. The provision of the Hobbs
Act which protects the major labor acts from modification" shows that
Congress considered national labor policy when it passed the Act. In-
terpretation of the Act in light of this policy would therefore be con-
sistent with congressional intent.
Under these federal labor acts, certain union objectives are ex-
pressly made unlawful, for example, forcing an employer to recognize
a ,union as a bargaining agent when there is already a certified union
representing his employees" or forcing an employer to enter into a
hot cargo contract." When violence or threats of violence are used to
65 Id. at 1009.
46 Note, The Hobbs Act—An Amendment to the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act,
25 N.C.L. Rev. 58, 62 (1946).
67 The Supreme Court accepted the proposition that other statutes should be
applied to labor in light of the policy of the labor statutes when it applied antitrust
laws to a labor union in UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
ea 18 U.S.C. § 1951(c) (1970).
66 29 U.S.C. I 158(b)(4)(C) (1970).
70 Section 8(b) (4) (A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to strike in
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obtain such goals, the activity could be found to be a "wrongful taking
of property" under the "legitimate collective bargaining objectives"
language of Enmons. Under this analysis of Enmons, this kind of ac-
tivity would therefore violate the Hobbs Act. For reasons that will
be discussed below," it is submitted that this interpretation would
give an overly broad scope to the Act.
Certain kinds of strikes are also forbidden by the federal labor
statutes even if they are aimed at legitimate goals. For example, a work
stoppage over grievances, which violates a no-strike clause of a con-
tract, is unlawful and in some cases may be enjoined under section
301(a) of the National Labor Relations Act." In addition, such union
actions as mass picketing which blocks entrance and exit" or pad-
locking gates used by other employees" sometimes amounts to restraint
or coercion of other employees in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act"—
even when these tactics are used to obtain legitimate union goals. If
violence or threats of violence are used in this kind of strike, a -, viola-
tion of the Hobbs Act could be found under a literal application of the
"lawful strike" language of Enmons. It is submitted that this too would
be an overly broad interpretation of the Act."
Although an isolated reading of the "lawful strike" and "legitimate
collective bargaining objective" language of Enmons could support the
above analysis, it is submitted that "unlawful strikes" and "illegitimate
collective bargaining demands", as used by the Court in Enmons,
should be read respectively for the purposes of the Hobbs Act as being
synonymous with "strikes seeking unwanted or unneeded work" and
"unwanted or unneeded work." This approach is more consistent with
legislative intent both of the Hobbs Act and the labor statutes and can
be reconciled with the Supreme Court's opinions in Green and Enmons.
order to induce an employer to enter into a contract which violates section 8(e).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A). Section 8(e) forbids hot cargo contracts, which are agree-
ments under which the employer "ceases or refrains . . . from handling, using, selling,
transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer . . . ."
29 U.S.C. * 158(e) (1970).
71 See text following note 76 infra.
72 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). The Supreme Court held in Boys Market, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), that an injunction in such a case is not
precluded by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Note, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 295
(1971).
78 NLRB v. UMW, 418 F.2d 240, 72 L.R.R.M. 2784 (3d Cir. 1969).
74 International Ass'n of Machinists (General Electric Co., Protective Device Dcp't),
183 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 75 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1970).
75 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)(A) (1970).
70 It would be possible to give an even broader interpretation to • the terms
"legitimate collective bargaining demands" and "lawful strikes." Under this approach,
a violation of the Hobbs Act could be found where the threats or violence involved
violated state labor laws. This approach would, of course, be limited to cases where the
action affected interstate commerce and there was no federal preemption of the area.
Such an interpretation would be impractical because it would leave the Hobbs Act too
open-ended. There would be great difficulty in finding limits to its coverage. A clearer
indication by Congress should be required to reach the position that such a radical
change in federal labor policy was intended.
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First, criminal penalties based on violations of the noncriminal pro-
visions of the other labor acts would be inconsistent with legislative
intent under these labor statutes and under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs
Act supplements existing national labor policy established by the other
federal labor statutes. The Act establishes a clear congressional man-
date that the use of force, violence or threats thereof to obtain payment
for unwanted or unneeded work or for no work at all is a federal
criminal offense if it affects commerce. Finding a violation based on an
"unlawful strike" or on "illegitimate collective bargaining demands"
presents a different situation. There is no clear mandate in the Hobbs
Act that the legality of the strike or the legitimacy of the collective
bargaining demands is to have any effect under the statute. Congress
has already provided noncriminal remedies for violations of this kind
of provision of the labor statutes and it is unlikely that it would intend
to apply criminal sanctions through such an indirect approach. The in-
clusion in the Hobbs Act of the section preventing any changes in the
labor acts" indicates that Congress took the labor acts into consid-
eration when it passed the Hobbs Act. In light of this, a clearer ex-
pression of legislative intent should be required to give "wrongful"
such a broad interpretation. A contrary view would require the con-
clusion that Congress intended to apply the harsh felony penalties of
the Hobbs Act to even minor incidents of violence solely because the
compensation which the worker was seeking was improper under the
labor acts. Under such a view, a minor act of violence; such as breaking
a window in a strike aimed at forcing an employer to recognize a union
when his employees already have a certified union, would subject the
worker to federal felony penalties. It is unlikely that Congress intended
such a harsh result in the Hobbs Act. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in
Enmons, rejected the application of the harsh penalties of the Hobbs
Act to such minor incidents of violence."
The legislative history of the Hobbs Act indicates that it had the
limited purpose of changing the result of Local 807. During the House
debates on the Act, Congressman Cox remarked: "The sole purpose of
the bill is to undo the outrageous opinion of the Supreme Court in the
Teamsters Union case."" That case excluded from the coverage of
the Antiracketeering Act union activities aimed at obtaining wages for
unwanted and unneeded work." If the sole purpose of the Hobbs Act
was to change that result, it should apply only where the force or
threats are aimed at obtaining compensation for unwanted or unneeded
work or for no work at all. The Act should not apply where workers
are seeking payment for-work needed by or desired by an employer.
The Supreme Court recognized this limited purpose of the Hobbs Act
in Enmons:
77 18 U.S.C.	 1951(c) (1970).
78 93 S. Ct. at 1015.
78 91 Cong. Rec. 11,841 (1945).
80 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
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[A]s frequently emphasized on the floor of the House, the
limited effect of the bill was to shut off the possibility opened
up by the Local 807 case, that union members could use their
protected status to exact payments from employers for im-
posed, unwanted, and superfluous services.'
This narrow view of the scope of the Hobbs Act is therefore supported
by the legislative intent of the Hobbs Act and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of that legislative intent.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Hobbs Act in Green
is consistent with this narrow approach to the Act's coverage. In Green,
a violation of the Hobbs Act was found on the basis of conduct which
may not have violated the Taft-Hartley Act." The Court thus ana-
lyzed the type of work for which compensation was sought without
relying on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the union's conduct under
the Taft-Hartley Act. This is 'consistent with the approach adopted
in the present analysis.
A limited construction is also consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion in Enmons, although it is not required by the opinion. The
Court recognized that the Hobbs Act was intended to have the limited
effect of extending coverage of federal criminal law to cases involving
the seeking of compensation for unwanted or unneeded services. In the
decision, the Court provides only one example of union objectives which
are not legitimate—seeking "personal payoffs" or payment of wages
for "unwanted or fictitious services."" On the other hand, the only
legitimate collective bargaining objective to which the Court makes
reference is "higher wages in return for genuine services which the
employer seeks."" The terms "legitimate collective bargaining objec-
tives" and "lawful strikes" can thus be interpreted as alternative ways
of saying that the term "wrongful", applies to cases where property
is obtained for work that is unwanted or unneeded by the employer or
for not work at all.
In Enmons, the Supreme Court has decided that the Hobbs Act
does not reach some incidents of strike violence which interfere with
commerce. The clear situation in which the Act does not apply is that
of legal strikes for legitimate collective bargaining objectives where
the workers intend to perform legitimate work for the compensation.
At the other extreme is the situation where the Act clearly does ap-
ply, the case of forcing an employer to provide compensation for un-
necessary or unwanted work or for no work. at all. Although it is not
entirely clear where conduct between these extremes will fall, the ap-
proach outlined above provides a method of resolving this question
consistent with the legislative purpose and the Supreme Court's past
treatment of the Hobbs Act.
81 93 S. Ct. at 1011.
82 See text at note 46 supra.
88 93 S. Ct. at 1010.
84 Id.
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Wherever the line is drawn, it will have important ramifications
in labor activities. Where the Hobbs Act does not apply, the employee
is saved from possible severe federal criminal penalties while the em-
ployer is forced to resort to the noncriminal remedies of the federal
labor acts or to state criminal law for protection.
DAVID G. RIEs
Copyright—Infringement of Dramatico-Musical Rights—ASCAP Li-
cense—Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Sperber.1—The Robert Stig-
wood Group Limited {Stigwood) is the holder of the dramatic rights2
to the opera Jesus Christ Superstar. Stigwood, in a suit alleging copy-
right infringement and unfair competition, moved for a preliminary
injunction' to enjoin the defendant, Original American Touring Com-
pany (OATC),' (1) from performing the opera Jesus Christ Superstar
or portions thereof; (2) from referring to Jesus Christ Superstar in
advertisements for performances of musical compositions from the
opera;" and (3) from using the name "The Original American Tour-
ing Company" in conjunction with performances of the musical com-
positions.°
OATC, which performed twenty of the twenty-three songs from
Jesus Christ Superstar in the identical sequence that they appear in the
opera, with one exception, contended that these performances were
permitted by its American Society of Composers, 'Authors and Pub-
1
 457 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1972), modifying 332 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
2
 The authors of the work Jesus Christ Superstar assigned the rights in the work
(except "King Herod's Song") to Leeds Music Ltd., which copyrighted the entire opera
as a "dramatico-musical composition" pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 5(d) (1970) and several
of the individual songs as "musical compositions" pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 5(e) (1970).
The individual musical compositions to Jesus Christ Superstar are protected by copy-
righting the opera. 17 U.S.C. 3 (1970). Leeds Music Ltd. assigned the United States
copyrights to Jesus Christ Superstar and to the several individual songs to Leeds Music
Corp. pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 28 (1970). The separate rights and privileges arising from
a copyright may be licensed. First Financial Marketing Services Group, Inc. v. Field
Promotions, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Hirshon v. United Artists
Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1057). Stigwood acquired the rights for stage
productions and dramatic presentations of the opera from Leeds Music Corp. 457 F.2d at
51-52.
3 Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Sperber, 332 F. Supp. 1206, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
' "The Original American Touring Company" (OATC) is the name under which
defendant booking agent, Betty Sperber, does business. The defendants put on concerts
which are represented as being performed by the Original American Touring Company.
The business details of the concerts are handled by Betty Sperber Management of which
Betty Sperber is President. 457 F.2d at 52.
5
 OATC was authorized to perform individual musical compositions to the opera
Jesus Christ Superstar as a licensee of the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP). The ASCAP license permits the licensee to perform non-dramatic
renditions of the separate musical compositions copyrighted by the members of the
Society. OATC's license extends to the songs from Jesus Christ Superstar since Leeds
Music Corp., from which Stigwood acquired its rights, is a member of the Society. Id.
0 332 F. Supp. at 1207.
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